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Abstract 
The “return to materiality” is a burgeoning phenomenon in philosophy, the social 
sciences and the humanities. New materialists make a case against cultural construc-
tionism and for a nondualist account of the world as comprised of fluid, ever-changing 
entities. This would allegedly offer grounds for an embodied, post-humanist emanci-
patory politics. The article problematizes such claim. By relying on techno-scientific 
accounts of materiality, new materialism embroils with the analytics of truth, neglecting 
how nondualist ontologies underpin today intensifying forms of domination over hu-
mans and nonhumans. A “critical” humanism is needed, which refrains from ambiv-
alent post-humanist narratives without reverting to dualist thinking. To this purpose 
Heidegger offers valuable insights.
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Resumen
El “regreso a la materialidad” es un fenómeno floreciente en la filosofía, las ciencias 
sociales y las humanidades. Los nuevos materialistas desarrollan argumentos en contra 
del construccionismo cultural y a favor de un relato no dualista del mundo, compuesto 
de entidades fluidas y en constante cambio. Esto presuntamente ofrecería fundamentos 
para una política emancipatoria de carácter post-humanista. El artículo problematiza 
tal afirmación. Al confiar en los relatos tecnocientíficos de la materialidad, el nuevo 
materialismo se ha embrollado con la analítica de la verdad, descuidando cómo las on-
tologías no dualistas sustentan hoy formas intensificadoras de dominación sobre los 
humanos y los no humanos. Se necesita un humanismo “crítico”, que se abstenga de las 
narrativas ambivalentes post-humanistas sin volver al pensamiento dualista. Con este 
propósito, Heidegger ofrece ideas valiosas.
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Introduction
The “return to materiality” represents a burgeoning phenomenon in philosophy, polit-
ical theory, science and technology studies (STS), the social sciences and the humanities. 
The wave begins to rise in the 1990s, taking growing momentum in subsequent years 
with a variety of labels: ontological turn, continental materialism and realism, new mate-
rialism(s), and others.1 Such labels designate fields and perspectives not completely over-
lapping. However, for simplicity and since I will focus on shared traits of this intellectual 
movement, in the following I will use “new materialism” as an encompassing expression.
From a perspective of history of ideas new materialism can be regarded as a reaction 
to the post-modernist “excessive power granted to language to determine what is real”.2 
However, the material turn needs to be contextualized, looking at the historical juncture 
in which it takes place, heavily marked by post-Fordist capitalism and neoliberal rule. 
Only in this way – that is, taking a genealogical outlook – one may go beyond questions 
of intellectual fashions or academic disputes, grasping the actual stakes of the issue, 
namely, how a burgeoning governmentality builds on what would purportedly offer the 
basis for an effective critique.
I start by considering three key features of new materialism: its core ontological 
tenet; the case for science and technology as offering solid grounds for such tenet; and 
its main normative corollary, concerning the emancipatory implications of new ontolo-
gies. I proceed with pointing out difficulties regarding the second and third issue. As for 
the former, I contend, the problem lies in the re-emergence, albeit in a disguised form, 
of what Foucault calls the “analytics of truth”. As for the latter, the problem lies in how 
nondualist ontologies can underpin opposite programs, emancipatory and domina-
tive. My conclusion is that only a “critical” humanism, which refrains from ambivalent 
post-humanist narratives without reverting to dualist thinking, may help work out a 
theoretical framework robust enough to stand the devastating social and environmental 
effects of runaway neoliberal capitalism. The last section makes a case for reconsidering 
in this light the question of humanism, looking at Heidegger as a possible inspiration. 
1. See for example D. Coole and S. Frost (eds.), New Materialisms, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2010; R. Dolphijn 
and I. van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies, Open Humanities Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2012; L. Bry-
ant, N. Srnicek and G. Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn. Continental Materialism and Realism, Re-press, Melbourne, 
2011; S. Woolgar and J. Lezaun, “The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology Studies?”, in Social 
Studies of Science, 43(3), 2013, Sergio Sismondo, Queen’s University, Canada, pp. 321-340.N. Marres, Material Participation, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.
2. K. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter”, in Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, vol. 28, n. 3, University of Chicago, 2003, p. 803.
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New materialism: three key features
Scholarship associated with the material turn includes, as said, a variety of approach-
es and fields of inquiry. Inspirational sources are equally variegated, from Deleuze to 
Foucault, from Merleau-Ponty to Whitehead, from Actor-network theory (ANT) to so-
ciologies of practice and Marxian accounts of the relationship between human labour 
and the material world. That said, the following features are shared enough to be re-
garded as characterizing new materialism in its whole.
The first one is a basic ontological standpoint: the rejection of the binaries tradi-
tional to modern thinking (nature/culture, mind/body, subject/object, matter/language, 
reality/knowledge, natural/artificial, sensuous/ideal etc.). Karen Barad’s “agential real-
ism” provides a good, and influential, example. She regards phenomena as “the onto-
logical inseparability of agentially intra-acting components. That is, phenomena are 
ontologically primitive relations – relations without preexisting relata”.3 Phenomena are 
not representations of things but things as such. Entities are continually reconstituted 
through material-discursive “intra-actions”, where neither the material nor the cultural 
aspect takes precedence. For example, the material set up of foetal imaging simultane-
ously supports and is influenced by a politics of individual autonomy and subjectivity. 
The foetus that the scientists can see as an object is also the foetus that law defines as 
an independent subject. Hence, “the foetus is not a pre-existing object of investigation 
with inherent properties. Rather the foetus is a phenomenon that is constituted and 
reconstituted out of historically and culturally specific iterative intra-actions of materi-
al-discursive apparatuses of bodily production”.4
Second relevant feature of new materialism, as Barad’s example indicates, is the case 
for science and technology as offering compelling evidence in support of non dualist 
ontological claims. In physics, life sciences, biomedicine and elsewhere material phe-
nomena are increasingly conceptualized in terms of porous boundaries. Distinctions 
between inorganic and organic, nature and artefact, matter and cognition, blur. For 
example, epigenetics challenges the gene/environment and brain/body dichotomies.5 
The inorganic realm is increasingly depicted as having vital connotations, while life 
is simultaneously infused with dematerialized characterizations – textuality, informa-
3. Ibid., p. 815.
4. K. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2007, p. 217.
5. D. Papadopoulos, “The Imaginary of Plasticity: Neural Embodiment, Epigenetics and Ectomorphs”, in The Sociological 
Review, vol. 59, n. 3, 2011, University of London, pp. 432-456.
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tion, codification.6 Mining and processing of huge amounts of data generate unfore-
seen insights where knowledge and production of reality, discovery (of interesting re-
lationships within the data) and invention (of meaningful associations among data), 
can hardly be distinguished.7 The penetration of computational processes “into the 
construction of reality itself”8 challenges the ontological divide between machine and 
organism. In short, new materialists stress, “new physics and biology make it impossible 
to understand matter any longer in ways that were inspired by classical science”.9 If ma-
teriality has been usually depicted as inert, stable, concrete, resistant to socio-historical 
change, the opposite evidence is emerging. Matter exhibits agency, inventive capacities, 
generative powers. It is a doing, an incessant becoming. The basic ontological condition 
is difference, or infinite variation.10
Third feature of the material turn are the normative implications drawn from its 
ontological claims. The argument runs as follows. Liveliness of matter means that all 
entities in the world result from reciprocal “concerns” or “affections”.11 Humans are 
immersed “within materiality’s productive contingencies”,12 which imposes a post-hu-
manist outlook on human agency, as disempowered and defective, distributed and 
assembled with nonhuman entities – hence also modest, careful and responsible. Ac-
knowledging the intimate entanglement with, and the agential powers of, things, their 
capacity to surprise and disappoint expectations, works as an antidote to human hubris 
and an invitation to a politics of care and hospitality.13 In other words, once material-
ity is seen as dynamic, active and unpredictably open, it paves the way to “a liberating 
anti-humanism”14 – liberating, of course, from the dominative orientation inherent in 
the dualist thinking of the humanist tradition, where one polarity always ends up claim-
6. E. F. Keller, “Towards a Science of Informed Matter”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences, vol. 42, n. 2, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2011, pp. 174-179.
7. J. Calvert, “Systems Biology, Synthetic Biology and Data-Driven Research”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biolog-
ical and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 43, n. 1, 2012, pp. 81-84.
8. N. K. Hayles, “Unfinished Work. From Cyborg to Cognisphere”, in Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, n. 7-8, 2006, Golds-
miths, University of London, pp. 159-166.
9. D. Coole, S. Frost, “Introducing the New Materialism”, in D. Coole, S. Frost (eds.), New Materialisms, Duke University 
Press, Durham, NC, 2010, p. 5.
10. Beside Barad see for example M. Hird, “Feminist matters. New Materialist Considerations of Sexual Difference”, in 
Feminist Theory, vol. 5, n. 2, Sage, London, 2004, pp. 223-232; E. Grosz, Becoming Undone, Duke University Press, Durham, 
NC, 2011.
11. I. Stengers, “A Constructivist Reading of Process and Reality”, in Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 25, n. 4, Goldsmiths, 
University of London, 2008, pp. 91-110.
12. D. Coole, S. Frost, “Introducing the New Materialism”, cit., p. 7.
13. See N. Clark, Inhuman Nature, Sage, London, 2011; J. Bennett, “The Force of Things: Steps Towards an Ecology of 
Matter”, in Political Theory, vol. 32, n. 3, 2004, pp. 347-372.
14. C. Colebrook, “On Not Becoming Man: The Materialist Politics of Unactualized Potential”, in S. Alaimo and S. Hekman 
(eds.), Material Feminisms, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2008, p. 74.
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ing predominance over the other. From this perspective the flaws of discourse decon-
struction emerge neatly. Deconstruction reproduces the separation of body and mind, 
matter and language. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of many recent struggles shows how 
discursive criticism is yielding “diminishing returns”.15 Thus, the approach to critique 
inherited by the philosophical tradition is to be replaced by affirmative standpoints, 
building on thingness and corporeality as sites of resistance, creativity, and hope. Polit-
ical struggles, in this sense, become “ontological”. They are to be approached no longer 
as human struggles occurring in a material world provided with its own, given features, 
but as socio-material struggles over the very constitution of what comes into being, as 
enacted in practices.16
Emergent issues: the analytics of truth and neoliberal govern-
mentality
To sum up, new materialists claim to react to the excesses of cultural construction-
ism without returning to traditional forms of realism, which is prevented by burgeon-
ing techno-scientific evidence and by the dominative implications of dualist thinking. 
The task is to develop emancipatory programs and strategies based on a “post-humanist 
performativity” (Barad), that is, on human and nonhuman refusals of stable identities 
and positions, their constant “productive becoming”.17
Various questions can be raised concerning the narrative above. An obvious one re-
gards the actual novelty of new materialism. Its multifarious inspiration indicates how 
nondualist ontologies can be retrieved in an array of theoretical positions. Marx, for 
example, already claims that humans cannot be conceived as separated from nature, 
though their relation with it is increasingly mediated by technology, as the product of 
human labour under specific social conditions. But even Descartes and Kant don’t go so 
far as to affirm that mind, as responsible of the technological transformation of mate-
riality, is completely detached from the latter. The issue, however, at least from a genea-
logical perspective, is not so much to assess how innovative new materialist ontologies 
15. S. Clough, Beyond Epistemology: A Pragmatist Approach to Feminist Science Studies, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 
MD, p. 2.
16. See A. Mol, “Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions”, in J. Law and J. Hassard (eds.), Actor Network Theory 
and After, Blackwell, London, 1999, pp. 74-89; A. Escobar, “Postconstructivist Political Ecologies”, in M. Redclift and G. 
Woodgate (eds.), International Handbook of Environmental Sociology, Second Edition, Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 91-105.
17. C. Colebrook, “On Not Becoming Man: The Materialist Politics of Unactualized Potential”, in S. Alaimo and S. Hekman 
(eds.), Material Feminisms, p. 64.
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are –  indeed, in the history of ideas complete novelty is a rare bird – as to understand 
the role such ontologies play in the present historical juncture.
This draws attention to the second and third points: namely, the role of scientif-
ic and technological advancements in new materialist arguments, and the norma-
tive implications drawn from nondualist ontologies. As for the former, such role is 
often so prominent that it is difficult to maintain, as some commentators do, that 
new materialism just aims to be a “catalyst to a changed perspective”.18 Its attack on 
classic western metaphysics and scientific objectivism does not rule out truth aspira-
tions. These are rather shifted to a meta-ontological level where at stake are not claims 
about the “whatness of things”,19 their stable identity, but about their contingency, 
their endless becoming, their continuous emergence and sinking. From this perspec-
tive, new materialism does not look a radical departure, but rather a further iteration 
of the western metaphysical tradition that Foucault labels the “analytics of truth”: the 
search for an access to universal truth. 
Of course there is nothing wrong in addressing theoretical questions in the light of 
“a well-informed understanding of new scientific and technological developments”20– 
also because this has happened frequently in the past.21 However, the risk is of neglect-
ing the social and historical embeddedness of scientific understandings and conceptu-
alizations. For example, in attributing textuality to things and ontology to signs, Vicki 
Kirby says that she has in mind “the code-cracking and encryption capacities of bacteria 
as they decipher the chemistry of antibiotic data and reinvent themselves accordingly. 
Are these not language skills? Is this not a very interesting case of epistemology as on-
tology?”22 Judith Butler’s reply is significant in that she warns against taking explanatory 
models as inherent in the phenomena being explained:
I am sure that encryption can be used as a metaphor or model by which to un-
derstand biological processes, especially cell reproduction, but do we then make 
the move to render what is useful as an explanatory model into the ontology of  
18. B. Washick and E. Wingrove, “Politics that Matter: Thinking about Power and Justice with the New Materialists”, in 
Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 14, n. 1, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2015, p. 65.
19. S. Woolgar and J. Lezaun, “The Wrong Bin Bag”, p. 333.
20. D. Coole, S. Frost, “Introducing the New Materialism”, p. 24.
21. The conceptual traffic (in both directions) between social and natural sciences has a long history, from Marx to Darwin, 
from immunology (see A. Tauber, The Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 
to cybernetics (see N.K. Hayles, How We Became Post-Human, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999). 
22. V. Kirby, “Subject to Natural Law”, in Australian Feminist Studies, vol. 23, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 9.
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biology itself? […] What of life exceeds the model? When does the discourse 
claim to become the very life it purports to explain?23
Similarly, reviewing Barad’s “intra-action” approach, which builds on Bohr’s phys-
ics, Trevor Pinch notes that 
Barad, like Karl Popper, seems to assume the very grounds that much science 
studies has contested. How is it that scientists can agree that phenomena are the 
same or agree on what makes an experiment repeatable? Once it is realized that 
repeatable experiments themselves come from a culture of trust, a shared form 
of life and shared practices […], then the orientation is focused once more on 
humans. […] I find it deeply puzzling that Barad can call for a more situated ac-
count of science and at the same time fail to situate the very part of science she is 
talking about, while drawing in a realist mode upon experiments to support her 
position.24 
It may seem strange that new materialists underestimate the conventional element in 
scientific encounters with matter. This could be considered a side effect, perhaps inev-
itable, of their forceful case against discursive deconstruction. Yet, I believe, the crucial 
reason lies in “the extraordinary challenges and perceived success of so much scientific 
and technological research”,25 the outcomes of which new materialists feel compelled to 
take as factual starting points. The problem, however, is that the success of science can 
hardly provide support to theoretical arguments. As Ian Hacking has argued, the notion 
of science’s success verges on tautology. Even the discovery of “fundamental constants 
of nature”, like the velocity of light, is not immune from tautology. Any difference in 
observation, to count as a difference, is to be achieved within the same conceptual-ex-
perimental framework (same assumptions, equipment and tacit knowledge to use such 
equipment). Yet, if the framework is the same, no difference can emerge; or, if it emerg-
es, it will likely be interpreted as a measurement error. Similarly, it makes little sense 
to say that an “alternative” science, to exist, should lead to as good results (for example 
in terms of yield of foodstuff) as the actual one. If this means that one has to pull off 
23. Ibidem, p. 10.
24. T. Pinch, “Karen Barad, Quantum Mechanics, and the Paradox of Mutual Exclusivity”, in Social Studies of Science, vol. 
41, n. 3, 2011, p. 439.
25. V. Kirby, “Subject to Natural Law”, p. 7.
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exactly the same specific material results of actual science, “then the alternative is not 
going to be an alternative”.26
The point, thus, is that what counts as success can be gauged only according to a set 
of questions that “make sense”. And they make sense beyond disciplinary frameworks, 
since such frameworks are affected by, and affect, in many ways the broader social con-
text.27 One cannot talk of success independently of human history and interests, nor can 
scientific accounts of materiality be taken as (more) veridical just because they repre-
sent the cutting-edge of a certain historical moment.28
This remark leads to the third question – the emancipatory implications of nondu-
alist ontologies and post-humanist outlooks. A clue to problems here is evidence of a 
burgeoning governmentality of science and technology which builds precisely on non-
dualist standpoints. Two well-known examples: carbon trading and biotech patenting. 
Carbon trading builds on the assumption that, once a conversion rate between the 
“global warming potential” (GWP) of CO
2 
and other greenhouse gases is defined (cour-
tesy of the IPCC, and despite a lot of uncertainties and speculative reasoning), reducing 
one of these gases anywhere in the world can be regarded as materially equivalent to 
reducing CO
2
 here. In this way, the intractable complexity of the real impact of different 
quantities of diverse gases emitted in opposite parts of the world at different times is 
transformed into a matter of calculation.29 Yet, what is exactly GWP? It is a conceptual 
abstraction like money, since it works as an exchange rate. However, for carbon trading 
to be more than an economic fiction or a mere financial game, it must be also a physical 
phenomenon, something happening (or prevented from happening) in the atmosphere. 
So GWP is simultaneously real and virtual, material and symbolic, a concrete thing and 
a conceptual construction. Premised on the commodification of the atmosphere is pre-
cisely this fluid constitution.
26. I. Hacking, “How Inevitable Are the Results of Successful Science?”, in Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, 2000, p. 64.
27. On this point the classic reference is L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1979.
28. The enduring attraction of social theory for the analytics of truth in the shape of cutting-edge science and technology 
manifests itself in the shape of a lack of reflexivity of otherwise outstanding scholars. For example, some contends that 
Deleuze’s theory is undermined by his reliance on an account of organisms that is alien to the conceptual terrain of current 
biology (see M. Hansen, “Becoming As Creative Involution? Contextualizing Deleuze and Guattari’s Biophilosophy”, in 
Postmodern Culture, vol. 11, n. 1 The John Hopkins University Press, USA, 2000). In other words, Deleuze would build on 
biological models that are no longer valid. Then one may ask why current accounts should be granted greater ontological 
validity, given that there is no reason to think that present views on life will not be superseded by other ones, perhaps 
completely different. Of course the question applies also to Deleuze himself.
29. D. MacKenzie, “Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of Carbon Markets”, in Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 34, n. 3-4 , Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2009, pp. 440 - 455.
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Consider now biotechnology. The fundamental feature of biotech is the combina-
tion of biology and informatics. “Life itself” becomes simultaneously matter and in-
formation, presence and pattern, “wet” and “dry”, real and virtual, moving fluidly from 
living cells to test tube, to digital databases.30 Accordingly, biotech patents designate 
ontologically ambiguous entities, oscillating between materiality and virtuality, thing-
ness and cognition. By regarding a living entity as an artefact if its basic functional pa-
rameters can be controlled (thus reproduced), they establish a correspondence between 
information and matter, so that rights in property over information can be subsumed 
into rights in property over the organisms incorporating such information, and vice 
versa.31 Moreover, the claim that patented artefacts are indistinguishable from nature 
for any practical purpose entails a further ambivalence: artefacts are identical to, yet also 
different (more usable, more valuable), the natural entities. Like carbon trading biotech 
thrives on ontological fluidity, or indeterminacy.
Governmentality studies have extensively accounted for the genealogy and spread 
of this outlook. For example, Pat O’Malley has documented how “an extensive and 
immensely influential managerial literature appearing since the early 1980s […] cel-
ebrates uncertainty as the technique of entrepreneurial creativity, […] the fluid art of 
the possible”.32 Proper calculations of risk become here the exception, while reasoned 
bets over unpredictable futures become the rule. This condition enhances danger and 
insecurity but is also seen “at the heart of what is positive and constructive”.33 Nikolas 
Rose has comparably analysed how, in neoliberal societies, a variety of expert influ-
ences increasingly draw people to make sense of their life in terms of self-fulfilment or 
maximization.34 Other scholars have shown how post-Fordism has developed in reply 
to the double crisis of the 1970s – energy scarcity and mounting environmental threats 
on one side; stagflation and declining profits on the other – building on emergent the-
ories of complexity, non-equilibrium and adaptive management, which originally rep-
resented “libertarian, environmentalist and often leftist critiques of the ‘command and 
control’ logistics of Cold War, first-order cybernetics”.35 Neoliberal managerial literature 
30. E. Thacker, The Global Genome, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007.
31. J. Calvert, “Patenting Genomic Objects: Genes, Genomes, Function and Information”, in Science as Culture, vol. 16, n. 
2, 2007, pp. 207-223.
32. P. O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Governance, Glasshouse, London, 2004, p. 3.
33. P. O’Malley, “Resilient Subjects: Uncertainty, Warfare and Liberalism”, in Economy & Society, vol. 39, n. 4, Routledge, 
London, 2010, p. 502.
34. See for example N. Rose, Inventing Our Selves, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; The Politics of Life Itself, Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007.
35. J. Walker, M. Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience. From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation”, 
in Security Dialogue, vol. 4, n. 2, Sage Publications, CA, 2011, p. 157. See also S. Nelson, “Beyond the Limits to Growth: Ecol-
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contends today how “nonpredictive decision making” makes us able “to do things with-
out understanding them – and to do them well”, becoming in this way “antifragile”, that 
is able to stand volatility, uncertainty and errors, the practical effects of ignorance and 
randomness being deemed “completely equivalent”.36
As one can see, the emancipatory implications of nondualist ontologies are far from 
obvious. Overcoming the subject/object, matter/knowledge, real/virtual and other bi-
naries and claiming the distributed character of liveliness and agency can be conducive 
to accounting for the human as humble, defective, caring and responsible, but also to 
opposite claims. If the world is inherently contingent and fluid, including the agent’s 
own “centre”, then there is no limit to what such an agent, eventually identifiable only 
as the source point of a will to be(come), can do to the material world, including his or 
her own physical constitution. This agent is a world-maker in the fullest sense of the ex-
pression, as the psychical and corporeal “self” can be moulded and remoulded together 
with its own framing conditions, in a blurring of internal and external similar to how a 
big-bang universe deploys simultaneously its material contents and their time and space 
framework. Needless to say, in this perspective any notion of restraint and responsibility 
evaporates, replaced by a radical experimentalism, where error is reframed from threat 
to opportunity. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the debate over “human enhancement”. In 
spite of careful attempts to distinguish post-humanist and trans-humanist, “humble” 
and “hubristic”, standpoints,37 telling them apart in regard to a number of emergent 
techno-human assemblages, from new prosthetics to brain-computer interfaces, is no-
toriously difficult. Indeed, the difficulty appears already at theoretical level. An example 
comes from Rosi Braidotti’s recent book on the post-human, the basic argument of 
which is that the “dynamic, self-organizing, transversal force of life itself […] conveyed 
by current technological transformations” – where life transmutes into technology and 
ogy and the Neoliberal Counterrevolution”, in Antipode, vol. 47, n. 2, 2014, pp. 461-480. The integration of emancipatory 
programs in capitalist agendas is a common trope of recent critical literature. About post-Fordist capitalism’s appropria-
tion of social oppositions to the Fordist mode of production see L. Boltanski and E. Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, 
Verso, London, 2005; P. Virno, “Do You Remember Counterrevolution?”, in P. Virno and M. Hardt (eds), Radical Thought 
in Italy: A Potential Politics, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, pp. 241–259. On a comparable line Nancy 
Fraser has discussed the “disturbing convergence” of second wave feminism with the demands of the neoliberal state. See 
“Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History”, in New Left Review, vol.56 Mar/Apr., 2009, pp. 97-117. On this issue 
see also L. Bazzicalupo. “Neoliberalismo e soggettivazioni femminili”, in T. Dini and S. Tarantino (eds.), Femminismo e 
Neoliberalismo, Natan, Roma, 2014, pp. 35-48.
36.N. N. Taleb, Antifragile. Things that Gain from Disorder, Penguin, London, p. 4 and p. 12.
37. See for example R. Twine, “Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanism”, in S. Parry and J. Dupré (eds), Nature After 
the Genome, Blackwell, Oxford, 2010, pp. 175-195; C. Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010.
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technology into life – is capable of “displac[ing] the exploitative and necro-political 
gravitational pull of advanced capitalism”.38 This claim, it seems to me, fails to consider 
how such transformations are entrenched in runaway neoliberal capitalism, beginning 
with the type of subjectivity the former promote and the latter presupposes (or vice 
versa): entrepreneurial, expansive, decentred, vitalistic.
The amazing success of the notion of Anthropocene is another clue to the hegemon-
ic status of such subjectivity. Implicit in the notion is the idea that humans can – indeed 
should – become effective “stewards” of the Earth system. This seems to reproduce at its 
highest classic western objectivism. However, if one looks at narratives provided with 
considerable traction at academic and policy level, such as the Breakthrough Institute’s 
Ecomodernist Manifesto39, a different picture emerges. According to the Manifesto, hu-
mankind has flourished despite growing damage to natural systems, where the damage 
is itself the consequence of human beings’ use of the biosphere to meet their needs, 
and desires. To escape pending threats, therefore, the Anthropocene is to be intensified 
and accelerated. Human societies should increasingly decouple themselves from natural 
biophysical systems. We can and should do without nature: conservation or preserva-
tion of “natural areas” is more a matter of aesthetic and moral commitments than of 
utilitarian ones. Such an outsized role for technology, as effectively a replacement for 
nature, implies a total blurring of the human and the nonhuman. The historical record 
of human transformation of nature is reframed as a testimony that nature is just what 
we want it to be. Technology replaces nature because it is ultimately indistinguishable 
from it. Better, technology produces nature as an internal differentiation of society (or 
capital?) – what is let be, as deliberately unexploited possibilities.
Reassessing humanism
In conclusion, the main problem with new materialism seems to be that no compel-
ling case for care and restraint vis-à-vis a lively materiality can ultimately be drawn from 
nondualist ontologies. Neglect for the historical conditions in which new accounts and 
approaches to materiality are deploying does not help to focus and address this point. 
Taking a “humble” attitude becomes a question of personal ethics or lifestyle choice – 
38. R. Braidotti, The Posthuman, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 61 and p. 141.
39. J. Asafu-Adjaye, L. Blomqvist, S. Brand et al., An Ecomodernist Manifesto, http://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto 
[accessed 30 March 2016].
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something of which capitalism is hardly afraid, since it represents a trigger of further 
market differentiation (think of slow food and other types of frugality). As a result, the 
case for new, ontological or embodied, struggles seems undermined already at a theo-
retical level.
The problem eventually lies in human agency and its relationship with the biophys-
ical world. If humanism and dualist ontologies entailed a dominative attitude and if 
nondualist, modest and caring, post-humanisms are hardly distinguishable from hu-
bristic hyper-humanisms, what should one do? Answering is hard. At the very least, 
I believe, the question of humanism is to be re-examined – once more. There are, of 
course, many ways to do that. In the remaining space I would like to suggest a possible 
direction, represented by a scholar who, no doubt, many consider an unlikely, if not 
untrustworthy, inspiration: Heidegger. 
I have to say, preliminarily, that I have little interest in the debate on Heidegger’s 
sympathies for Nazism and their implications for his philosophy. Even if it would be 
based on entirely blameworthy premises, I believe one should not consider such philos-
ophy automatically irrelevant or misleading. The point I want to stress here, then, is that 
in spite of his critique of humanism and how such critique has been in its turn the target 
of sustained criticisms, his account of the human can be quite valuable for devising a 
new, “critical” humanism – that is, a humanism based on a reorientation of technology 
in a non-dominative, self-limiting direction.40
Heidegger takes issue with humanism because its various versions build on, or aim 
to ground, a metaphysics, which in its turn consists in a determination of the essence 
of the human that already presupposes such essence. In the western tradition, meta-
physics begins with the definition of man as the zoon logon echon, that is, an animal 
provided with an additional character. So the essence of man is located in physis, nature. 
The problem, then, is to make sense of this addition: logos. According to readings, logos 
corresponds to reason, personhood, soul or else. For Heidegger, logos means first of all 
language. Yet, language is neither the expression of an organism, nor is it a property 
of humans. Rather, as Heidegger says in the 1957 Freiburg Lectures, to the extent that 
language belongs to physis, nature, or being, that is to the constitutive principle of all en-
tities, it is this principle that manifests itself through human language.41 Man, Heidegger 
40. The relevance of Heidegger’s insights to the problems discussed here is more extensively addressed in my Ontological 
Politics in a Disposable World: The New Mastery of Nature, Ashgate, Farnham, 2015, where I also argue how Heidegger is 
hardly the technophobe he is often depicted.
41. See M. Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 122 ff.
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stresses elsewhere, does not have language; instead, “language is the house of Being. In 
its home man dwells”.42
Language represents for this reason the fundamental line of division between hu-
mans and the nonhuman – within a single ontological reality. In a famous passage of 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he says that the stone is “worldless”, being insen-
sitive to the surrounding reality; the animal is “poor in world”, in the sense that it has no 
possibility to stand out of a specific relation with the environment, as established by its 
biological features; the human being, instead, is “world-forming”, in the sense that it has 
no preordained relationship with its surroundings.43 This world-forming capacity en-
tails the openness of humans to the manifestation of being, hence to the endless conflict 
between concealment and disclosure, lethe and aletheia. Animals and plants instead are 
excluded from this experience, having access only to particular entities, specific mate-
rializations of being. The indication of such exclusion is their lack of language; or, vice 
versa, human language is the field where the experience of concealment and disclosure 
occurs.
This simultaneous critique of humanism and apparent reinstatement of a most tra-
ditional type of humanism in the form of an “abyss” separating the human and the non-
human world has raised a host of censures.44 The anthropological exception, moreover, 
would be disconfirmed by growing evidence about the evolutionary history of humans, 
and about the linguistic capacities and non-instinctual behaviour of animals.45 Howev-
er, at a closer examination things look a bit – or a lot – different.
For a start, and without repeating what said already about the problems of building 
theoretical arguments on contingent scientific evidence, one has to ask whether or not 
such evidence avoids to be caught in the “anthropological machine” – the mechanism 
by which any empirical evidence allegedly gathered on the emergence of the human 
from the animal, on their distinctions or similarities, is already inscribed in metaphysi-
cal assumptions about humanity and life. As far as I can see, critics of Heidegger hardly 
escape the trap. An example comes from Peter Sloterdijk’s intervention in the issue. 
42. M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, Harper Collins, New York, p. 217.
43. See M. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, Indiana University Press, Bloomin-
gton, 1995, p. 185 ff.
44. Among the most famous are those of Jacques Derrida. See for example “Geschlecht II. Heidegger’s hand”, in J. Sallis (ed), 
Deconstruction and Philosophy. The Texts of Jacques Derrida, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, pp. 161-196; Of 
Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991; The Politics of Friendship, Verso, London, 
2005. See also R. Esposito, “Heidegger e la natura umana”, in MicroMega, 4, 2005, pp. 227-238.
45. For these objections, see for example P. Sloterdijk, Die Domestikation des Seins. Für eine Verdeutlichung der Lichtung by 
Peter Sloterdijk, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2000.
M. Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008.
After stressing how we have never to presuppose ‘man’ to subsequently find it in some 
way in pre-human stages46, he makes his case for anthropogenesis by doing precisely 
that: presupposing the human according to the features we know (or believe to know) 
about it, and then deriving these features from evolutionary mechanisms, allegedly ev-
idenced by scientific research, such as insulation against selective pressures, thanks to 
communal living, and neoteny (that is, the retardation of somatic development which 
leads to the flourishing of brain and enhanced learning capacities). On the opposite side 
of the issue, pretending to address the ontology of animal life “on its own terms”47as 
many scholars in post-human and animal studies do, not only is an impossible task, 
but it easily leads to taking our outlooks on animality (which are not only human, but 
also historically and socially contingent) as ontological truths. The result is a reiterated 
dominative relationship in a disguised (hence potentially more dangerous) form.48
Of course, one can rebut that also Heidegger builds his own account of the anthro-
pological exception on some experiential evidence – arguably less reliable than scientific 
one.49 However, if we consider how he describes the human condition as a dynamic 
of unconcealment and concealment, as the experience of the opening to a closure, of 
the ontological (rather than contingent) limits of our access to truth, then Heidegger’s 
empirical basis takes a genealogical, rather than metaphysical, character. Heidegger’s ex-
periential reference is not provided with the veridical pretence of (current) techno-sci-
ence, with its alleged progressively realized merging of truth and things and the domi-
native retroaction of such claim onto the present.50 Heidegger’s are not assertions about 
the “real” constitution of humans and animals, or matter in general, but an admission of 
its ultimate obscurity. Not by chance he does not seek to establish a hierarchy between 
humanity and the rest of the world. The difference between humans and animals does 
46. P. Sloterdijk, Die Domestikation des Seins. Für eine Verdeutlichung der Lichtung by Peter Sloterdijk, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
am Main, 2000.
47. M. Calarco, Zoographies, Colombia University Press, p. 89.
48. In this sense it has been observed that, contrary to Donna Haraway’s claim, the OncomouseTM does not embody the fall 
of the nature/culture dualism, but rather a further commodification of nature (see Z. Weisberg, “The Broken Promises of 
Monsters: Haraway, Animals and the Humanist Legacy”, in Journal of Critical Animal Studies, vol. 7. n. 2, 2009, pp. 22- 62). 
More in general, it is symptomatic how new materialists talk of matter as text and writing or account for the behaviour of 
things in terms of concern, affect, desire, elusiveness, in this way anthropomorphizing nature at the very moment in which 
they seek to eradicate the predominance of the human.
49. For this objection see J. Derrida, “Geschlecht II. Heidegger’s hand”, The University of Chicago Press,Chicago and Lon-
don, p. 173.
50. The increasingly vociferous claim is that we are just about clarifying a host of fundamental things: from the basics of life 
to the nature of mind and consciousness. What we need just a further bit of research (and money), to get full confirmation 
of what we basically know already, on the grounds of which we therefore can and have to act now. A well-known by-prod-
uct of this narrative is what Ulrich Beck calls “organized irresponsibility”: technologies are legitimated on the grounds of 
knowledge deemed reliable, yet liabilities for accidents and “side effects” are rejected on the grounds that scientific knowl-
edge is always limited and perfectible.
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not correspond for him to a superiority of the former. As he clearly states in Section 
46 of Fundamental Concepts, being poor in world does not mean having less but doing 
without. The comparison between man and animal does not permit any evaluation in 
terms of perfection or imperfection, of higher or lower essence. The same applies to dif-
ferences within the animal kingdom. Moreover, the “poverty” of the animal is a human 
way to describe a condition that, from a different viewpoint, could be regarded as rich-
ness, in a relationship with the world that may be precluded to humans (see Section 60). 
Furthermore, the animal appears to us as open to its own lack; something which entails 
an “essential shaking”: the suffering and tension of the living beings towards their final 
liberation of which some poets, or St. Paul, in the Letter to the Romans, talk (see Section 
63). This constitutes the background against which the essence of being-man stands 
out, indicating difference together with tight closeness (see Section 67). 
In short, for Heidegger, the relationship between human and animal cannot be de-
picted in terms of hierarchy, but rather of incommensurability. The animal – and by ex-
tension the whole nonhuman world – remains for us eventually mysterious, enigmatic. 
Likewise enigmatic remains the human.
Saying that the essence of man is its being-in-the-world as opened to the dynamics 
of clearing and obscurity does not lead to deciding anything about God, about the pos-
sibility or impossibility of divinity. The point is not theism or atheism. The point is the 
respect of the boundaries that have been set for thinking as such. […] Insofar as 
thinking limits itself to its task it directs man […] into the primordial dimension 
of his historical abode. […] Thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing 
still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other [as new material-
ists do, I add, with their case for a universal ontology of difference and becoming]; 
thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the 
nearest.51
Conclusion
New materialism constitutes a major intellectual shift of recent years. Its import, 
however, can be fully appreciated only by taking a genealogical perspective and consid-
51. M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, Routledge, London, p. 254, my emphasis.
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ering its relationship with a burgeoning governmentality of the human and nonhuman 
world. In this light problems emerge regarding the emancipatory implications of non-
dualist ontologies. Failing to recognize that the latter may underpin more restrained and 
respectful encounters with materiality but also intensified dominative thrusts seems no 
negligible shortcoming. 
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily entail going back to old dualisms, 
but rather avoiding to draw from the acknowledgment that there is no separation be-
tween world and (human) sense-making of the world the assumption that there is no 
remainder between things and words, matter and cognition, the agent and its (self-)
establishment or overcoming; that knowledge and life join together in a frictionless 
dance of encounters and transformations. The value of Heidegger for a reconsideration 
of the question of humanism in the present historical condition lies first and foremost 
in his insistence on the fundamental obscurity of the essence of nature and human 
nature; of humans’ constitutive condition of non-correspondence with themselves; of 
the unbridgeable division between knowledge and world and, with it, between humans 
and other living beings – a division, however, which does not set different ontological 
spheres but occurs on a single plane of immanence. Furthermore, this division does not 
imply, as it has often been concluded, any hierarchy, nor justifies domination but, on 
the contrary, brings near the world and its inhabitants as companions in a never-ending 
task of disclosure. So understood, the “anthropological exception” looks completely dif-
ferent – indeed opposed – to “human exceptionalism”, a theme currently re-emerging 
in the context of the Anthropocene debate as a plea for a “post-natural” sustainability.52
From this viewpoint, and despite well-known political and theoretical frictions, 
Heidegger is very close to Adorno. Both regard subject and object, thought and world, 
as enmeshed from the outset.53 Both develop a sustained critique of technology and 
instrumental reason. Moreover, Heidegger’s account of the “thrown” condition of ex-
istence, which entails for the subject a structural gap, a lack of self-mastery, an irre-
deemable non-correspondence to itself or an irreducible moment of negativity, is “fully 
compatible with Adorno’s dialectical understanding of non-identity”.54 What Adorno 
52. M. Arias-Maldonado, “Rethinking Sustainability in the Anthropocene”, in Environmental Politics, vol. 22, n. 3, Rout-
ledge, London, 2013, pp. 428 - 446. A rejection of human exceptionalism characterizes, instead, the literature on the com-
mons. See for example O. Marzocca, Il mondo comune, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2015.
53. Regarding Adorno this emerges in a number of places. See for example T. W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object”, in T.W. 
Adorno, Critical Models, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 245-258.
54. I. Macdonald, “Ethics and Authenticity: Conscience and Non-identity in Heidegger and Adorno, with a Glance at 
Hegel”, in I. Macdonald and K. Ziarek (eds), Adorno and Heidegger. Philosophical Questions, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA, 2008, p. 15.
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calls identity thinking, and Heidegger calls the reduction of being to entities as they 
present themselves, constitutes a common plea for the difference between the world and 
its images or concepts; a statement about reality as always something else from what we 
grasp of it.55
This, I believe, is of paramount importance in the present historical juncture. The 
integration of post-humanist outlooks in runaway neoliberal capitalism is more than a 
theoretical possibility: it is a concrete, intensifying, governmental practice. In this situ-
ation, Heidegger, Adorno and other masters (for example Benjamin) offer the contours 
of a much-needed critical humanism: humanism, because emancipatory programs can 
hardly build today on post- or anti-humanist standpoints; critical, because it does not 
draw any hierarchical, dominative, implication from the “human condition”. Such con-
dition, on the contrary, urges restraint and respect for the world – beginning with our 
own bodily and psychical constitution – according to a humbler, historically and bio-
logically embedded, account of humanity.
55. See L. Cortella, Una dialettica nella finitezza. Adorno e il programma di una dialettica negativa, Meltemi, Roma, 2006, 
p. 123 ff.
